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Women, work and recession: 
the other face of unemployment 
Roberta Hill* 
In analysing ·women's economic role in a recession; critics and proponents of the 
"reserve anny of labour" theory usually focus on the phenomenon of female unemploy-
ment. This paper looks instead at the effects of a female labour reserve on those in emplo¥-
ment during a recession. The work e~periences of 22 clorlling machinists are used to 
illust~ate the argument that ,a reserve of labour is a competitive force which facilitates 
mana~ement strategies to counter declining profitability. It is argued that such strategies 
can be pursued particularly successfully with a female workforce. 
Introduction 
The characterisation of women as a reserve army of labour has gained wide currency 
among feminists and writers of the Left.1 Proponents of this view argue that women, 
particularly those who are married, have been used as a convenient reserve of labour to be 
drawn into the workforce during an expansionary stage of an economic cycle, and to be 
disposed of when production contracts. For example, Owen (1978, p.26), has written that 
Women have long been regarded as a reserve army which can be called upon in 
times of war or when a shortage of male labour threatens to push up rates of 
pay - and then relegated to unpaid domestic labour when the economy 
requir,es it. 
Similarly, Adamson et al. {1976, p.l6) maintain that women exist for capital, 
as a cheap, unorganised source of labour. They can be called upon to augment 
the industrial reserve army, available to be drawn into or thrown out of 
employment according to the needs of capital accumulation at any particular 
time ... They are available at home to be drawn into production when necess-
ary and can be thrown back into the home when accumulation stagnates. 
Milkman (1976) and Gardiner (1975-1976), on the other hand, reject the view that 
women, as a distinct social ,grouping, can be discharged from employment during economic 
crises. Milkman (1976, p. 75) has argued that although the reserve army concept is useful 
for analysing the entrance of women into the paid workforce over the long-teint, it does 
not "tell us very much about th~eir economic roles in a period of crisis". She points out that 
since the sexual division of labour among occupations creates an inflexibility in the 
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structure of the labour market, women cannot be expeJled from the workforce in the 
manner suggested by the theory. She goes on to argue instead(Millanan, 1976, p.7S) that 
in an economic crisis it might be women's work in the home, rather than their labour-
market participation, which is "forced to take up the slack". In analysing women's employ-
ment in Britain between 1966 and 1974, Gardiner ( 1975-1976) found that the proportion 
of women among total employees actually rose during this period of economic contraction, 
and that women who were discharged from employment in manufacturing were being 
absorbed into the services sector rather than leaving the workforce altogether. She con-
cludes, therefore, that in these years, women did.not act as an industrial reserve army .. 2 
More recently, Anthias (1980) discounts the explanatory potential of the classical form 
of the reserve army theory when applied to women's employment. She argues (1980, p.SO) 
among other things, that the concept 
refers to the role of "unemployment" within the abstract capitalist mode, 
whereas the main problematic concerning women's employment is its increase 
and the particular fortns that it takes. 
The problem with both the proponents and the critics of the concept in its application 
to women is that, since they tend to focus on only one of the different senses in which 
Marx used it, they fail to identify all the functions which a reserve army fulfds. Female 
unemployment is seen only in terms of a total discharge from the workforce, and the 
emphasis on job insecurity obscures the importance of the reserve artny as a force which 
depresses wage-levels during economic recession. Those writers who have discussed 
women's role in keeping wages down have tended to concentrate on the contribution made 
by their domestic rather than their wage labour.3 For these different reasons, analyses and 
criticisms of the concept in its application to women's employment have at best been only 
partial.4 
Marx's Use of the Term 
Marx {1975, pp. 628-645) employed the concept of an "industrial reserve arnty" in 
Capital to show how labour was used in the process of capital accumulation. However, his 
analysis was not worked out in detail, and he never clearly distinguished the different 
senses in which he used the tenn. 
In the fust place, he spoke of different types of active reserve army labour required for 
capital accumulation. One group of these comprised floating workers who would move 
from job to job as labour was used and discarded by different capitals. The other, llltent 
workers, were drawn into employment when an absolute increase in the size of the working 
population was required for expanding industries or for new branches of production. 
Secondly, Marx used the concept to describe the forJJ1s of labour generated, or made 
unemployed, by the process of capital accumulation. These were the floating, latent and 
stagnant pools of unemployed. The floating pool was created in the urban centres of 
industry when technological developments replaced labour with new machines. The latent 
pool, Marx argued, was the result of the introduction of capitalist technology into agri-
cultural production in the rural areas. Subsistence producers in these areas for1ned a latent 
pool, because unlike the floating workers, they could not be immediately absorbed into 
capitalist production, although their decreasing ability to subsist on the land made them 
potentially easy to absorb should capital require them. The stagnant pool became un-
employed for very long periods, and was generated by the periodic long-te11D tendency for 
the rate of profit to fall. 
2 Gardiner (1975-1976, p.13) does analyse how IUgh rates of redundancy affect women's pay and 
other working conditions, but she does not attempt to do so using the army concept. 
3 A notable exception, however, is the analylil by Beechey (1977). 
4 Beechey (1977) has also criticised Milkman and Gardiner for the same reuon. 
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In the fint section of the paper, the New Zealand clothing industry and the worJdnas of 
the bonus system within clothing factories, are briefly It is argued that, .,. .... -i .. 
periods of high unemployment, the existence of a pool of unemployed feJJlale wodcea 
tends to facilitate employers' attempts, using the bonus system, to intensify 
work9 to counter declining profitability. The next section gives examples of other 
strategies, also based on the bonus system, which are used during economic crisis to cut 
the real wages of staff and lay off the least productive workers1 0 without provokina effec-
tive uninn action. The concluding section shows that, while all employees are vulnerable to 
sudl strategies, female workers tend to c01nply with methods for achieving goals 
which are less likely to be tolerated by men. 
It is the argument of this paper that, although the particular strategies used by 
e1nployers to maximise profitability are probably peculiar to the clothing industry, a 
similar process of work intensification and cost cutting could occur when semi-skilled 
female workers are employed in other industries with declining profits. 
The New 
1be clothing industry in New Zealand has a predominantly female workforce. In moat 
factories and work-rooms the manager is a male, and men are more likely to work as 
deaipers, pressen, cutten and warehouse assistants, but the machinists, supeniaon and 
examinen are almost always women. For example, at the time of the study, about 85% 
of the Canterbury (etc.) Clothing Worken Union were women, and only two of the 3,000 
members were male machinists. 1 1 
S This ctinstlnction wu noted by Beechey (1977, p.64) in a footnote to her uticle. 
6 See am (1979). 
7 SeeA~clix. 
8 l.iJce Ill the names which refer to the interviewed women or to the factories In which they worked, 
tlda Ia a 
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Butterworth (1978, p.ll) has cbaracterlaed the work done by many women in New 
Zealand in the following way: 
~he work-~laces are widely dispened: the work is in small units of employment 
1n many mstances. It is subject to cycUcal and seuonal fluctuations· it is 
generally low-skill to unskilled . . . ' 
Commenting that the sectors of industry involved are often vulnerable to competition, she 
cites g&11nent manufacture as one example. According to Butterworth, the small-unit 
enterprises of such industries "are under-capitalised, and have perennial cash-flow 
problems" (1978, p.ll). . 
The work process in the clothing industry varies according to the nature of the product 
and the level of technology employed In the large factories with modem technology, the 
production process is divided into numerous separate operations. Each operation is per-
foiJned by different machinists using a variety of machines. For example, one Christchurch 
clothing factory which manufactures jeans has 28 different machines for 38 stages of the 
work process. One of these machines is a "bar tacker". The woman who operates it will 
attach five belt loops to each pair of partly-completed jeans with a bar tack (or small row 
of stitching) at the top and bottom to foiJil and hold the loop. At the same time, she will 
sew two bar tacks at the bottom of the fly of the jeans and one on each comer of the four 
pockets - 20 bar tacks in an. That operation will be repeated dally by the same machinist 
on hundreds of pairs of jeans. This work is referred to in the clotbing trade as "production" 
or "piece work". 
• 
The medium-sized factories which make a variety of men's or women's clothes may 
divide up the work process so that the younger and inexperienced machinists are assigned 
to piece work. They will, for example, sew the fob pockets of men's trousers and shorts, as 
well as belts or collars for blouses and dresses. These pieces will then be attached to the 
garment by the experienced machinists, who are responsible for joining up the main pieces. 
Clothing workers refer to this as "making the whole garment". This work is done by 
safety-stitch machinists, overlockers or straight sewers. The work might then be finished 
off by a machinist operating a blind hemmer. Work on the hemmer is again considered 
piece work. 
In the smallest factories or work-rooms, which tend to manufacture higher-priced 
"quality" clothes, machinists are usually responsible for making up virtually the entire 
gaintent. Typically, the workplace is a fashion boutique or small tailoring firm. 
A machinist making the whole gaatnent, such as a woman's coat or man's suit, performs 
skilled work requiring several years' training and work experience. However, the demand 
for such skill declines as the production process is divided up, or "de-skilled". Many 
machinists in the jeans facto!)', for example, needed only to hold the fabric against a metal 
guide, move a lever by knee, foot or hand, and the machine automatically completed the 
appropriate operation. 
The Bonus System 
The clothing trade is labour-intensive, technologically "backward", and vulnerable to 
competition. Although some productivity gains can be made by investment in 
technology, . competition among fmns depends heavily on intensifying the labour process 
and lowering labour costs. Therefore fa11ing profitability can be countered, in the short 
te1n1, fust, by increasing the intensity of work which raises output per hour. Strategies 
to achieve this include ( 1) basing wages on output (or piece-wages) and (2) strict super-
vision and discipline. Second, wage costs can be cut by resisting wage demands and by 
laying-off the least productive workers. The· greatest potential for pursuing these strategies 
in the clothing industry lies in the bonus system. 
Ne~ 
, she 
·Unit 
·flo~ 
duct 
, the 
per. 
urch 
~f the 
lt mil 
U ro~ 
e will 
~four ~t 
may 
·gned 
ts, as 
the 
I 
eres. 
te by 
· ed 
'ced 
ntire 
orms 
and 
any 
etal 
the 
to 
tin 
·es 
Oa 
,,)·t' '~ 
, a paid • a reward for -~!l-~.·-
ae to w01k hud. for 
d of work, and wJaat ts 
.. ~oatpatiD 
of making a bonus spun 
pay out more In the IDCNIIId. 
between the 
faa, also out of 
for how, 11 an overlocker at Carlen, 
had to make ne•rly SlO a clay. So Jeollifer [the owdOcker 
her) aet herself a t-.et of S30. I would try 125 
to eacoarase me. uHow much haYe you done?" So used to wort it oat. "011. 
come on you've aot to 10 a bit faster than that!" So I'd get stuck into it 
Go ••d ... 
the ~au machinist, spoke of ,ealousles" amoq ~ girls at 
You t find in every place that you work, there misht be a bit of 
yoa do that eYBJwhere. "Oh look what 1he~ aot. Make more aoaey 
on that than what I've aot." 
lacldent demODStrates how such jealolJIY over Willi to 
of the boaua site had one 
week abe had made up 111 palli of womell'a 
that to do my same job just elida 't believe I could 
'~ [That clay] I knew tiUs lady was me. So juat to 
to so a little bit futer, and wu I by the time t11o 
t 
Jemdfer explained, questions were about tbe Dill 
• 
ea1978WIJIIaa4 
162 Roberta Hill 
-
The older lady had put word into the supervisor that I wu putting down more 
than I'd done. The work had to be checked. 
Q. Why do you think she did that? 
A. It's really just jealousY. They can't put out what you can and when you go 
home with a big fat pay-packet and they go home with hill{ that . . . 
Uealousies arise. 1 
The amount of work and the time taken by each machinist is monitored weekly, ostens-
ibly in order to calculate bonuses, but its effect is also to intensify the pressure to raise 
output. The actual details of how work-output is recorded varies from factory to factory. 
Typically, the women themselves note the price they are given when they are allocated a 
particular bundle of work. They divide their minimum weekly wage by five. This daily 
wage is then divided by the price given each particular piece in the bundle. From this the 
women can determine the number of pockets, belts or gannents they are required to 
produce in eight hours to make the day's wage. The same principle applies when the cal-
culation is based on time rather than on price. At the end of the day, the supervisor or boss 
also checks the work done by each machinist, and a record is kept for comparison. At the 
end of the week, machinists and management have a record of the amount of work that 
each woman has done, calculated in terms of the weekly wage. If a machinist makes $20 
over her wage, for example, she will be paid a $20 bonus. If she is $20 down, she must 
still be paid the award rate, but this "failure" has important implications as a potential 
means of increasing work speed. · 
First, to make their wages, machinists must work at a pace determined by the time or 
prices set by management, and most of the women seemed to accept them as a norm for 
"doing a fair day's work". Second, because the women's work is recorded, a boss or super-
visor knows when any machinist is down on her wages. Being told that she is so many 
dollars down makes a machinist feel uncomfortable, guilty or resentful. She will try to 
avoid being placed in such a position again, and will attempt to increase her speed to 
. complete the required output. Carters Clothing Factory, for example, made its machinists 
record the work they did each day in notebooks which were collected once a week. The 
following conversation with Judy illustrates how the notebook system worked. 
There was the big worry on the Tuesday. They used to collect your books in 
and if you didn't make your time they used to come out and give you a little 
talking to. 
Q. Did they? 
A. .Well, if you were too far down (PAUSE) see they would work it out, if 
you were $10 down they'd write it "Minus $10". Mn Carter would write 
it in. And they would not write when you made a bonus ... 
. 
Q. What did it make you feel like? 
A. Very guilty, because you see they were paying you a full wage whether. 
you were $20 down, and they paid you that, and they obviously made you 
feel it by putting this in your book. 
Later in ·the interview Judy r~ferred again to the notebooks: 
Those books they kept. It was so tight the system there. They would count 
(PAUSE) you'd write it in your book, then they would count it, almost calling 
you a liar, then would write it down them~elves and check that off with the 
other. one. They had a big card on the office wall on who made it [their wage 1 
aftd who didn't make it. We weren't never allowed to see it, though when you 
went in the office the odd time you used to see it. They used to check up on 
• 
everyone. 
raise 
ctory. 
ted a 
daily 
ais the 
ed to 
e caJ. 
r boss 
t the 
that 
s $20 
must 
.ential 
me or 
rrn for 
super· 
many 
ry to 
ed to 
' . 
.  ,..,, 
at a 
IIPdODJ II a on their speed 
to tile Bon111 System 
..._..oqh the bonus system provides a variety of to oil .. 
' work and increase output, there are lbnita to its ability to do 
can be ca11ed in if the price or time for any task Is cut, and, more ._... 
wDl leave for jobs if pushed too hard. Factories pin reputations for 
teuah, and clothing workers quickly learn through an inforanaJ social network 
they should avoid. ly in boom periods when Jabour is likely to be scarce, 
theBe Hmits can be very real. 
Howewr, if a hits the industry, 1 3 the least competitive firms may haw to lay 
off worken to cut labour costs, and some factories will close down, layins off larp 
munbeu of work:en. If the recession becomes more general, and unemploy-
ment oceun, a pool of unemployed women will be available to fiJI the unskUJed and 
Mlllli-lkWed jobs in the remaining clothing firms, as well as in other industries. In this 
.... . . v .... a machinist is much less likely to leave her job. Particular forms of work inteoat-
fieatioa can therefore occur which overcome some of the Jhnits usually operatius on the 
bonus ayst,em. Seventeen of the machinists volunteered inforn1ation that 
expBcitly or implicitly, marked variations in the pace of work they had each expcrieaced 
in their various jobs, and these variations correlated broadly with references they made to 
changing economic circumstances within the fu1n and in the industry generally •14 
Stretehins the I .i•nits 
Cutting 'Times' and Hours of Work 
TheoreticaDy, an employer cannot cut the times allocated to the specified operations in 
the manufacture of a particular style of ga•1nent. However, times can be manipulated in 
such a way as to do just this. Three different strategies \'Jere referred to by the women. 
The tint involves changing the style of a garment slightly and then Bivin& it a lower 
price. During the interviews, reference was made a number of times to the way Carters had 
"cut their times towards the end". Olive explained how this had been done. She had 
speaking about the unpleasant work atmosphere at Truftt Clothing Factory where she 
currently working. She contrasted this with Carters, where "you could haw a bit of a joke 
aad that amonpt yourselves./[ the atmosphere's better". Then she added, 
13 The stent of the in the clothing industry dudna the research pe1lod ia by the 
estimate that, iD the Canterbury area, approximately S 20 rednMancJea. and 32 cloaurea of factories 
or work-rooms occtllled in the period between January 1977 and January 1919. 
14 n.e were exceptiom. Francine, in referring to a factory from which she hacl been laid off, com-
that "their times were a lot better than some of the other places". 
164 Roberta Hill 
It was just when the atmosphere really started to change the girls thought "Ah 
well, to hell if they're going to drive us like this" (PAUSE) 
Q. And did it change? 
A. Yes, I think it did,.and they had all this worry of the place faJJ;ng through, 
and probably the gn-ls suffered at their expense, but (PAUSE). 
Q. What, they started to (PAUSE)? 
A. Yes, put the screws on us and all that sort of thing. Before Christmas it 
started. 
Q. Were you ever aware that they cut your times? 
A. Oh yes, they did, but where we couldn't do anything about it was they 
changed the style a bit. To do mohair coats, $1.69. Sometime after that 
we did a coat, $1.40 something, only changed in the s1ightest way, and the 
price was lower, but we couldn't do a thing about that because that was a 
new style. It might have been a different pocket, (PAUSE) 
Q. And the coat would take the same amount of time? 
A. More or less the same sort of coat but just changed a little bit. 
I 
• 
The following comment from Caroline also suggests the extent of the intensification of 
work in the factory at that time. Jennifer, the machinist to whom Caroline refers, was one 
of the fastest at Carters. (During her interview she -had spoken of "nearly doubling her 
wages" on one or two occasions.) 
All the old prices, every time we got a wage rise, they'd be stepped up so much 
percent. The things they'd been doing for years had a really good price on 
them. But as it g9t to the end the prices got lower and lower and it got harder 
and harder to make your wages, and even Jennifer sometimes couldn't make 
her wages, and sometimes you'd be $20 down . , . 
Similar pressures to increase work output were employed in other fums in financial 
difficulties. Sandra, for example, prefaced her answer to a question about what she had 
done in her second job with the comment, "It was a leather place. They've gone down" 
(she meant the work-room had closed since she was working there). When asked why she 
had left, ·she replied: 
They made you work really fast. You had to do your work and that was it. 
Times [set by the boss] were hard. It was difficult. 
Using the fastest machinist as a basis for setting times was the second way in which the 
pace of work could be intensified. Three of the women volunteered information about this. 
As Cheryl explained it, 
all you needed was one person able to make the time and the union couldn't 
do a thing about it ... 
I've talked to girls at other places and a lot of them comment how it's not fair 
that they take the times from the fastest machinist or one of the fastest there. 
Then she added, matter-of-factly, "well, they're going to make their money if they can 
get everyone up to that standard." 
The third strategy for manipulating times was to cut the hours of work while still 
expecting the machinists to produce the same output. Here I .isa is speaking about 
Trim wear Garments, a Christchurch clothing factocy of similar sire to Carters. 
He [the manager] cut our hours down and expected us to do 40 hours' work 
when we were only getting paid for 36 hours, and some of the girls (PAUSE) 
well I could get nearly half of it out. I got my wage out but he expected us to 
get ~ bonus out and we couldn't, we just couldn't, not with 36 hours; and we 
had to do 14 coats a day. In one part we had to do 24 ... He expected us to 
do 24 coats a day. Half of us couldn't even do 12. 
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IateMifying Superilion and Di.tclpline 
It hal been lliJUed that different strategies are used during periods of 
a1dllty to cut the times given machinists to complete specific tasks. of the lmpoit-
ance women attach to making their wages, and the effects of a bonus in work 
their output per hour is increased accordingly. The other way in which the output 
of machinists be raised is through stricter supervision and w6rk cUscipHne. 
Closer supervision of the job itself can raise productivity. Wo1nen who were fast machtn. 
llts spoke of being "pushed" to keep up their output. Cheryl, for example, was 
of new boa who took over three months before she left Mitchells. 
When I was on the blind-hemmer he'd come up to us and say, "well I want you 
to make $6 bonus tomorrow," if you made S the day before. Kind of pushed 
you a bit (PAUSE) 
Q. Did he? 
A. As though to push us. Well, they were maldng good ovedleads on ow 
bonus you see so (BREAK) oh it's good for him if we (BREAK) but I 
used to get so tired. 
In speakins of factories where they felt d, women made 
reference to "Uttle chats" from the boss or supervisor about the need to output 
becauae were tough". For example, Ida commented that in th~ months before they 
were made redundant from Carten, 
Jeanette [the supervisor] used to come and say "You girls have got to hurry. 
They're going crook about you girls not working harder." And ''You'll all be 
without jobs if you don't work a bit harder. Cut out talking and work harder." 
Tfsht dudng work houn also output. Eight of the women who had 
worked during the recession in seven different factories volunteered explicit of 
extremely tight work-discipline. Three of these women left their within a days. 
The ex•mplel at that at a time of in the clothina industry, 
factodea cau be extremely severe. However they do not whether 
as a rum's economic circumstanc;ea wonened, although it 
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In the clothing industry, or eupenJaon typically q, control the amount of 
time women spend in talking and not worldq. What is signtficaat from the interviews are 
the extraordinary lengths to which in the seven different factories went to control 
time wasted not only in talking, but also ill visits to the tonet. After leaving Carters, Clare 
went to a small factory, where the boss "was expecting more than twice the (normal) 
amount out of us", and she commented that 
• 
he'd watch you all the time. While I was in the toilet one time he came and 
turned the light off. He was trying to save every cent he could. The switch 
was out in the hallway and he turned it off. And he'd time you [going to the 
toilet]. To him that was lost time, lost minutes to him if we went to the toilet 
two or three times a day and take three or four minutes each time. It was really 
incredible. 
The boss at Trim wear Garments where Lisa went after losing her job at Carters was more 
explicit. The following conversation was a response to a question about what she thought 
of machinists' wages compared with those of other workers. T,isa replied that the money 
at the jeans factory where she was then working was good, but it was too low at 
Trim wear's. She went on, . 
• 
I reckon I should have got more money because you were getting pushed, and 
you were working as hard as you could to get their wage. Even if you went to 
the toilet the boss always had his eye on you to see how many times you went 
to the toilet, and I reckoned that was silly. 
Q. Do you really think he watched how many times you went to the toilet? 
A. He even told me. He come up to me and quite a few girls when we first 
started there, and he says "Don't go to the toilet too much." He says 
"You're only allowed to go in your breaks." That was his way. 
Before you started work you had to go, then you had to go at morning 
tea, your lunch hour. Even though you didn't want to go you had to go. 
He says to me, "I watched one girl just yesterday and she went to the 
toilet eight times." 
This is how Caroline spoke of the boss at Charltons, a small suburban clothing factory 
with a staff of 15. (At one stage later in the interview, she had commented, "of course, 
he was all going bankrupt. I think he's still going [in business], but he's still going 
bankrupt.") She had just been asked what her fifth job had been. She named the factory, 
and went on, 
• 
I was there getting on for two years, and oh, he was a pig, he really was! He 
used to take it in turns to pick on different girls each week~ 
Q. In what kind of way? 
A. He used to go right up the stairs to his office and he had a little peep 
window up there and he used to watch, until they'd be working all morn-
ing, and then they'd stop for five minutes and say something to someone 
else and he'd come running down the stairs [the office was on a mezzanine 
floor above the machinists]. He'd come storming out and scream his head 
off at them for talking or he'd sneak up behind you, and he'd slam his 
hand down on the table and say [raised voice]: "How much have you 
done today?" Oh he was terrible. 
Reducing Wage Costs 
I have argued that funts with declining profits may attempt to stave off bankruptcy by 
intensifying work using a variety of different strategies on the bonus system. Firms 
can also employ a number of methods to reduce wage costs. The interview data suggest 
that in a recession the wages of existing staff can sometimes be cut, and the least 
productive workers laid off, without always provoking effective counteraction by the 
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1be 8nt method relates to the payment of S4 weekly 11 
the job, Jennifer had been told that this was paid to an thole 
evmy day on time for work, and took no time off during that week. 
'r.',lt:tl~ •• 
. ' . 
cow,ed that she was not going to be paid thJs money, the 
and new worken would not receive it. In her sewnth week 
repreeentative had a discussion with about half of the staff. It was, 
only the ones who got [attendance money] and I thou-i)lt everyone got it. 
Wen, the boss had put a plea across to the workers that ''Mitchell's isn't doiq 
so weD at the moment and things are tough in the clothing trade, and women 
are getting made redundant, and would those who get attenda.nce money, 
would you put up your hands and volunteer to give it up?" So what did they 
do? They all put their hands up except for two women. So, because those two 
women didn't the union was called in. And did he do his nut: the union blo e . 
[Contrary to what the boss had said 1 he said the firm we were worldns for wu 
one of the safest jobs around because we have export, and the govemmeat 
subsidises them. So they had a secret ballot. Only those who got atteDdauce 
money. They all decided they didn't want to give [it] up . 
• 
In this instance union action WtlS effective in preventing a wage cut. 
The second method concerns a seven percent cost-of-liYing adjustment to 
waaes. A dispute arose over the basis on which part-time worken were to be paid 
The seven percent went to all workers on the tint S 100 of their wage. 
at tbat stage were earning just over $100 gross, and received the full $7. The 
d 
at Mitchell's, however, paid part-time worken 7 percent on their wefklY wage of $88, but 
were not pmpared to adjust their bonus earnings over that •mount. 
1be women voted on the issue. Twelve were against the payment for the part-time11, 
34 were for · • There wu a meeting between the b011 and the women, Jennifer IBid. 
The boss said ''those girls who were full-time that had nothing to do with 
(the part-time workeD). Why were they backing the others?" He aot reaU.y 
wild. He'd done his block. He ranted and raved. 
Q. Did the girls say anything? 
A. The girls were so they just didn't know what to · 
is the stupid thing about it. Some of them were thinking ey 
to lose their jobs. This is how really terrifyiq [sic] the do 
"You can't lose your job, not over a union matter." "Oh yes 
"you can't". 
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Two days later we W 
tive 1 , all in tho room t..,tMr. .Pat 
about bonuses, aatl fature Be 
minds. And thea we W a 
for me or [she Gl.e t»aaa). Ia etller words, the 
and you know what 13 with the 11Jlion aad 34 we• 
how (PAUSE) he terdfies the airls. 
Q. Just him, or is this fairly typical of the you've been in before? 
A. Oh, a lot of b do scare the lids, but he haa his own way. 
Q. Of those really terrified, was it the older ones, the younger ones, mttrrled 
women? Any puticular group? 
A. No it's just women. It's just a feeling that a 1'111111 is talking over them. 
(PAUSE) That's the only way I can explain it. They were just scared 
because that's a man ta1Jdng over them. He's the boas and he's got the MY. 
Well, it's not always that way. But they just cannot see it. See, like when 
the union was there, one puticwar lady was agreeing with the union so 
much, then when the boss was talking she'd be asreeins with the boss. You 
know. And that just doeat 't go down with me. They're just too scared to 
back each other. 
• 
I have shown from the interview data three ways in which wages could be cut when 
fuiJts are seeking to reduce labour costs. AI already pointed out, the union can intervene 
when times are directly cutin the ume way, if women are fired, they haw a right to claim 
reinstatement, and the union can be ca11ed in. Furthennore, if retrenchment is necessary, 
then redundancy payments may have to be paid to those who ue laid off. In practice, 
however, it seems that staff DIJmbers can sometimes be reduced and both these con-
sequences avoided. 
• 
During a recession when times or prices are manipulated, only the fastest machinists will 
be able to make their wages. The dower ones will be consistently down each week. A boss 
or supervisor can. then "legitimately" claim that the slow machtn;st is not her wages 
and must go. 
As I have shown earlier, mnce women tend to the times u a norm for a fair 
day's wage, if they are down on their wages they feel guilty and worry about their failure. 
This feeling is heightened by remarks that are made to them about being "so many dollan 
down". Those who are fued are then unlikely to go to the union, even if they consider 
their dismisul unfair, because being fired is putly seen as a personal failure. 
Two of the machinists had been fired from jobs they went into on leaving Carters. 
Naomi was told to leave Trimweu's after one week. The way she described being sacked 
shows how readily she submitted to although she obviously coDiidered she had 
been treated unfairly. She had just explaJned that the boa had come to her before work 
ended on Friday. 
The way he went about it, living you the sack! I mean, they could have given 
you a week's notice, or said, if you don't pick up in a week I'm afraid we'll 
have to let you go. But to give you two minutes' notice. That wu a bit lousy 
that. It's just that I wasn't fast enough. Jeanette (supervisor at Carten] told 
me I'd got six months' [trial] to try to set up my quota. If he [Trimwear's 
boss 1 had given me even a month~ trial, I reckon I'd have aot the hang of it. 
Naomi went on to say that other worken had told her quite a bit about the place • 
• 
• 
He give others the push. It's a wonder they don't ao to the union. But after I 
got it I just give up. 
Q. Did you go to the union? 
A. No. 
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Q. Why? 
A. Oh, I don't know, I just give up then. To be sacked, though, that was dis-
gusting! In my books (PAUSE) that was disgusting, in my books to be 
sacked. I just couldn't hack it, just couldn't face being sacked. It's the first 
time I've been sacked. I've worked all my life. Never! • 
Q. You could go to th,e union? 
A. Steve [her husband] reckons I could have got reinstated, but I said no. I'm 
giving it up. I just went to the pack after that. I just (PAUSE) being 
sacked (PAUSE) that was the most disgusting thing. 
For Naomi, having a husband to support her was clearly also a factor in her compliance. 
She did not seek work again for over two months. 
Robyn complied in a similar way. The following conversation with her also summarises 
reasons why women might submit more readily than men to lay-offs or firing. When she 
was fired in June from a clothing factory after four weeks' work Robyn was pregnant and 
knew she would be fmishing anyway in December. In the interview she had just been asked 
if she had contacted the union after being laid off. 
If I wasn't pregnant and I knew that I had to keep working for a period of time 
I would have thought about it, cos that's different (PAUSE). I mean, there are 
not that many clothing places left [because of factories closing] and it makes 
you think twice. 
Like Naomi, Robyn was too slow, but, she explained, she "went slow at first to do a 
neat job. In a new job, you are slower, but you know you're going to speed up." She said 
that the factory "just wanted extra hard workers". She spoke of talks from the boss in 
which he said that "people have got to pull their weight on the machines (PAUSE) to keep 
the place going, cos sales are harder", and then commented, 
But rm a hard worker anyway. I used to work quite hard. I really tried, and 
my work's not scruffy. I just couldn't keep up with the (PAUSE) I couldn't 
produce what they wanted me individually to do. 
At another stage in the interview she referred back to that job. 
They didn't give me a chance. l 'hey said, if you don't get your time up you 
have to go. I more or less got told to go. I said, "I'll go anyway." That was 
embarrassing that part ... 
His wife (who worked in the office] said, "Oh you've been good here, but 
you're not quite up to our standard." So I said, oh well, I'll make it easier, so 
I'll just leave, and that was that. 
Conclusion 
In the preceding discussion I have shown different ways in which limits to the bonus 
system can be stretched or overcome during a recession in the clothing industry. The dis-
cussion reveals the complex processes that appear to lie behind women's lack of resistance 
to mechanisms for intensifying work and cutting wage costs. Based on the interview data, 
it seems that women tend to comply with these mechanisms for either one, but more 
usually a combination, of four main reasons: 
First, the existence of a labour reserve means women cannot readily find new jobs 
should they leave their present ones, and their fear is that they "will be sent down the 
road" if they resist management's demands. This is why they tend not to raise with their 
union such matters as time-cuts, excessive work discipline, or wage-cuts. 
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• Second, women are accustomed to complying with authority, male 
authority.1 5 At the same time, male employers are accustomed, in their domestic role u 
husbands, to exercising authority over women. SiDce women tend also to lack confidence 
and are unsure of their abilities, they ue vulnerable to sugestions that their work is too 
slow. 
• Third, production under a bonus system tends to divide memben of the female work-
force against one another. This hinders them in developing any common interest they have 
as workers, and makes it hard for them to stick together on issues that individuals raise 
with the union. 
Fourth, women in peintanent relationships typically see their primary role as working in 
the home and caring for children, and this sexual division of labour can provide them with 
fmancial support from their husbands. Women might therefore submit more readily to 
wage-cuts and lay-offs when they define themselves as a "second-income earner", or when 
lay-offs occur early in pregnancy or coincide with the stage when they intended "to start 
a famlly". 
There are a number of problems associated with using the reserve army of labour thesis 
to analyse women's employment, particularly during a ·recession. One major problem 
centres on the idea, suggested by the theory, that women (particularly 11111rried women) 
can be brought into the workforce and dispensed with as conditions of production change. 
A serious objection to this conceptualisation is that there is a sexual division of labour 
among occupations which creates an inflexibility in the labour market. 
The argument of this paper has focused, instead, on what happens to the nature of the 
work women do in a recession when they face competition from a female labour reserve 
for a reduced number of jobs. It suggests that working women may intensify their work-
effort and submit to wage-cuts because such management strategies can be pursued most 
successfully with a female workforce when unemployment is high. 
I have illustrated the argument with reference to the particular work experiences of the 
22 clothing workers studied. These illustrations reveal the pressures on women to comply. 
The argument does not preclude the possibility of women in the clothing industry 
developing effective worker organisation and taking collective action when they see their 
livelihood threatened.1 6 The Rixen clothing workers' protracted sit-in is an obvious 
example. Given the nature of the pressures faced by the women in the study however, 
research is needed to determine under what conditions women in such industries will be 
able, or prepared, to confront male employers in their collective interest. 
Appendix 
The argument of this paper was developed primarily from a study of the work 
experiences of 22 women made redundant from Carters Clothing Factory in 1978. 
In-depth tape-recorded interviews (ranging from 1 ~ to 3 hours in length) were conducted 
in the homes of each of the women. Between them they had held 112 machining jobs in 
more than 65 different clothing factories and work-rooms predominantly in Canterbury 
and Westland. Their ages ranged from 17 years to 69, and 17 of the women were in stable 
relationships. 
Carters began production in the early 'seventies with a staff of between 35 and 40. This 
number had been reduced to about 28 by the time Carters, in serious financial difficulties, 
went into receivership. The Carters, who owned the factory, laid off the entire staff apart 
15 The M.A. thesis from which this paper is drawn should be consulted for further evidence to support 
this claim, which is, however, consistent with the findings of research in the sociology of sex roles; 
for example, Novitz (1978). 
16 See for example Conway (1979, pp.16-17). 
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